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Concerns about failed and fragile states have put state- and nation-
building firmly on the academic and policy agenda, but the crucial role of 
public services in this process has remained underexplored. The 1960s and 
’70s generated a substantial set of literature that is largely missing from 
current writing. It identified state penetration, standardisation, and 
accommodation as key processes in the state- and nation-building 
sequence. This article analyses these three processes in Western Europe in 
the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, and the role of public services 
therein, to explore how they may help us to understand the success and 
failure of state- and nation-building in developing countries and fragile 
states.  
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1 A renewed interest in state- and nation-building 
 
Any cursory review of recent publications in the fields of development, politics or 
international relations will confirm that ‘state-building’ has experienced a sustained 
renaissance of interest since the early 2000s (Dobbins et al., 2003; Fukuyama, 2004; 
Šelo Šabić, 2005; Ottaway, 2002; Rondinelli and Montgomery, 2005; Lister and Wilder, 
2005; Etzioni, 2004; Berger and Weber, 2006; Hopp and Kloke-Lesche, 2005, Whaites, 
2008; Rocha Menocal, 2010). It is the primary topic of several recent books, journal 
symposia and research initiatives, with an even larger literature that relates implicitly to 
the topic. 
This renewed interest follows shifts in the literature and in practice in the 1990s 
towards a ‘rediscovery’ of the role of institutions and the state for development and 
democracy (Evans et al., 1985; North, 1990) after a decade of focusing on reducing the 
role of the state and unleashing the market (Fukuyama, 2004). Effective institutions 
came to be seen as prerequisites for building a functioning democracy (Wang, 2003: 
41), and good governance made its entry in the development discourse. As international 
donors have increasingly focused their attention on fragile states, the concept of ‘state-
  
building’ has become mainstream in development practice and researchers have 
ncreasingly emphasised the importance of legitimate effective public institutions for 
development (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002; Brinkerhoff, 2005). In this article we 
focus primarily on fragile states, purely because that is the context in which the state-
building agenda has risen in importance amongst development policy-makers. However, 
we also recognise that the article is relevant to other development contexts.  
As part of state-building strategies, international donors are increasingly focusing 
on strengthening state public services in recipient countries. In earlier decades, they had 
tended to avoid the state in their efforts to provide public services such as health, 
education, sanitation, etc. to the poor, and instead relied on provision through markets, 
non-profit organisations, NGOs and other types of voluntary organisations. Recently, 
however, they have begun to investigate whether such strategies, geared towards 
efficient and effective public-service delivery, may affect state capacity and citizens’ 
identification with the state (OECD, 2008a, b; Batley and McLoughlin, 2010).1 
Research on state-building from the early and mid-2000s tended to overlook the role of 
public-service provision, instead concentrating on governance dimensions such as 
democratisation and elections (Waldman, 2007; Wang, 2003). If services were 
addressed, research tended to focus on centralised activities rather than decentralised 
delivery, and on the ‘how’ of delivering services in weak or fragile states (for example, 
strategies for coping with weak infrastructure or sequencing interventions) rather than 
‘why’ public services may be important for state-building. Service-delivery goals in 
fragile states were generally viewed as legitimate ends in themselves, with an 
unquestioned assumption that improving services would generally improve state 
legitimacy (Waldman, 2007). 
However, research in this area is constantly evolving. In the last few years, 
understanding has shifted to a much more politically nuanced concept of state-building. 
The OECD now defines it as ‘action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy 
of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual 
demands between state and societal groups’ (OECD 2008a). Politics has come centre-
stage. DFID similarly is viewing state-building through a political lens, in particular 
investigating the role of ‘political settlements’ in determining state resilience. Political 
settlements are defined by DFID as ‘the forging of a common understanding, usually 
among elites, that their best interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of 
organising political power’ (Whaites, 2008; see also Di John and Putzel, 2009). The role 
of services in state-building is increasingly preoccupying donors, and services are now 
widely viewed as having a political role to play, and as making a complex contribution 
to the development of state/society relations (Eldon and Gunby, 2009). This is not 
surprising; experts on service delivery in non-fragile contexts have long argued that 
service provision is a highly political undertaking (Batley, 2004; Joshi, 2006). We 
would underscore this point, emphasising that donors cannot assume that service 
provision is an apolitical, non-controversial starting-point for state-building 
interventions. Instead, as this article will explore, the delivery of public services is an 
inherently political issue that has been used for political ends throughout history.  
 
                                                          
1. At the time of writing DFID is in the process of awarding several research programmes related to this 
topic. 
2 Exploring European experiences 
 
Notwithstanding the large growth of publications on state- and nation-building, a 
number of high-profile examples, such as the reconstruction of the state in post-war 
Germany and Japan, or, more recently, Bosnia, have received disproportionate attention. 
Admittedly, Germany and Japan ‘set a standard for post-conflict nation-building that 
has not since been matched’ (Dobbins et al., 2003: xiii). But, much of the traditional 
literature on state- and nation-building is remarkably absent from the current writings 
that try to shed light on the situation in, for instance, Iraq or Somalia. During the 1960s 
and ’70s, scholars devoted considerable attention to the processes of state- and nation-
building in Western Europe in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries (Migdal, 2001; 
Eisenstadt and Rokkan, 1973; Rokkan et al., 1987; Tilly, 1975a). In Europe, the work of 
Stein Rokkan was central to the development of new frameworks for analysis (Flora et 
al., 1999), and Tilly has broadened our understanding of macro-historical processes and 
evolutions (Tilly, 1975a; 1992). Much of this literature also extended to developing 
countries because decolonisation had created a need to build new nations (Bendix, 
1964; Stone, 1965).  
In this article, we shall rely on a number of key concepts used in this European 
literature to reflect on the importance of public services in current state- and nation-
building. We first show why it is important to distinguish between state- and nation-
building, and how the two processes complement each other. We also show why certain 
terminology is being used in the international donor community. We then illustrate how 
public services played a role in state- and nation-building in Western Europe. More 
specifically, we shall describe three separate processes that have been identified by the 
literature: penetration, standardisation, and accommodation. Subsequently, we discuss 
the implications of these findings for current state- and nation-building in developing 
countries and fragile states. We end by formulating a number of challenges for 
contemporary state- and nation-builders. 
 
3 State- vs. nation-building 
 
There is much confusion over the terms ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ (Hippler, 
2004; Goldsmith, 2007). Historically, in a Western European context, the terms refer to 
different periods in time. State-building refers to processes in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Europe, when many of the contemporary states started to 
consolidate, requiring the further development of modern bureaucracies (Tilly, 1975a). 
Nation-building mainly refers to nineteenth-century processes further contributing to the 
psychological integration of states. In nation-building, states reached out to the masses, 
and public services have been an important instrument in this. The nineteenth century 
saw the emergence of conscription, obligatory schooling, as well as an improved 
communications and infrastructure network through new roads, railways, and postal 
services (Weber, 1976). These ‘agencies of change’ (ibid.: 193) completed the process 
of state-building, and contributed to the development of a nation.  
In current development literature, most people use ‘state-building’ to refer to 
interventionist strategies to restore and rebuild the institutions and apparatus of the state, 
for example the bureaucracy. In contrast, ‘nation-building’ also refers to the creation of 
  
a cultural identity that relates to the particular territory of the state. In current 
approaches to state-building in developing countries and failed states, the focus is on 
making governance effective (Rondinelli and Montgomery, 2005). The literature 
generally neglects the ‘building a cultural identity’ aspects of nation-building, choosing 
instead to focus on the more technical aspects of building state capacity. Writers might 
therefore claim to be writing about nation-building, but in fact their emphasis is really 
on state-building. Indeed, recent work from the field of development studies almost 
exclusively uses the term ‘state-building’. 
There are historical reasons why external actors engaged in state-building 
activities might be cautious about their choice of terminology. Whilst state-building and 
nation-building are often used interchangeably in current debates outside the field of 
development studies, they have not always been perceived as synonymous. Nation-
building was heavily discussed in the literature of the 1950s and 1960s and carried a 
strong conceptual link to modernisation theories of development (Dinnen, 2006; 
Hippler, 2005?). During the Cold War, the US and the USSR both used ‘nation-
building’ as a tactic to limit the reach of their enemy. However, by the 1970s the term 
fell out of favour, having been linked with the US’s involvement in the Vietnam war. 
The recent willingness to discuss state-building in terms of ‘neo-imperialism’ or ‘neo-
colonialism’ (Mallaby, 2002; Paris, 2006; Etzioni, 2004) has led parts of the 
development community to distance themselves from this terminology for fear of being 
accused of ‘neo-colonialist’ activities.  
However, although ‘state-building’ is possibly a less controversial term than 
‘nation-building’ for external actors to use to describe their interventions, there has, in 
recent years, been a tendency for the difference between the two terms to become less 
marked and for them to be used interchangeably by many in the international 
community. This is most common in non-academic, non-development-related circles, 
and has probably been influenced largely by the tendency of the former Bush 
Administration (and, as a result, the media) to use the term ‘nation-building’ for its 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, it is increasingly being used for 
activities that could more accurately be described as ‘state-building’. 
A further issue contributing to the confusion is that the development community 
has debated the extent to which all development activities can be categorised as state- 
and nation-building (Mallaby, 2002). Many aspects of mainstream development activity 
such as those focusing on good governance or anti-corruption and the increasing focus 
of development policy on politics and the state are actually state-building activities, 
albeit not explicitly labelled in that way. In general, despite the now widespread use of 
the term, development experts have been slow to adopt the language of state-building. 
This may be an attempt to distance themselves from the modernisation theories of the 
past and the aggressive foreign policies of the present, or it may be in recognition of 
what an extremely large and diverse topic state-building really is – development 
practitioners generally tending to specialise in aspects of building state capacity rather 
than claiming expertise in how to develop all aspects of a nation-state. Hence their 
tendency is to focus on specific aspects (for example, service-delivery measures, tax 
reforms, civil-service reform, infrastructure development, democratisation, political 
party support, public financial management training, civil-society support, peace-
building and conflict management) rather than tackling ‘state-building’ as one coherent 
concept.  
 
4 The role of public services in European nation-building: Key 
processes and implications 
 
Public services are what makes the state visible to its citizens – citizens’ direct line to 
government. They make the state tangible through an almost daily interaction, direct or 
indirect. States are shaped by images and practices (Migdal, 2001: 16), and public 
services contribute to their creation. Standardised and relatively centralised public 
services have played a pivotal role in state- and nation-building in Western Europe 
(Barker, 1944). While the state or the ruling powers had been visible for a long time 
through several types of ‘public services’, such as tax collection, justices of the peace, 
conscription in the army, etc., major changes happened when (modern) states started to 
consolidate. Several processes in nineteenth-century European state- and nation-
building contributed to this increase in visibility: post offices, town halls, police posts, 
hospitals, schools, etc. were built in many localities; people were hired and paid as 
police officers, village teachers, railway station masters, town hall clerks, etc. thereby 
creating a sense of loyalty and belonging to the state; public infrastructure works made 
the previously distant centres of power more accessible (Weber, 1976). 
Territorial consolidation is one of the key characteristics of the development of the 
modern state (Finer, 1975: 87). An entirely decentralised approach to public services 
would make the state wither away and become invisible (Paddison, 1983: 29; Fesler, 
1965). The development of public services was part of a process of nation-building 
through coercion and homogenisation (Tilly, 1975b: 43). Institutions such as obligatory 
schooling or mass conscription contributed to the socialisation of the population into the 
values of the state, while the new physical networks (railways, roads) and standardised 
public services such as post offices contributed to a physical and mental integration of 
the national territory. Public services carried and diffused the values of the new nations. 
These institutions and networks created a visible distinction between ‘in’ and ‘out’ and 
helped to establish clear territorial boundaries. This definition of boundaries also 
happens through small things such as changes in road markings or traffic signs, in the 
same way as a presence or absence of certain commercial ‘brands’ indicates that you 
have left a certain area or country. Public services in this way contribute to the bonding 
between the state and citizens.  
Our thinking about the role of public services in state- and nation-building in 
fragile states and other developing countries may benefit from an analysis of processes 
of state- and nation-building in Western Europe. The descriptive and analytical 
historical literature, and the conceptual writings of Rokkan and Tilly in particular, 
reveal three main processes: penetration, standardisation and accommodation. Public 
services may contribute to the integration of peripheries and to the consolidation of a 
territory; they may contribute to a standardisation, thereby facilitating exchange, 
mobility and equity; and they may be used as a tool for power-brokering, pacification, 
and accommodation. 
 
4.1 Processes of penetration 
 
  
Penetration refers to a process of establishing the presence, authority and visibility of 
the state or the ruling powers. Finer defined it as ‘the ability of the government to act 
directly upon the population by its own agents, instead of through intermediate local 
bigwigs’ (Finer, 1999: 161). The aim of penetration is to contribute to the cohesion and 
legitimacy of the state through a process of political and territorial socialisation and, in 
Max Weber’s words, to establish the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory’ (Weber, 1974: 78). Public services are an important instrument 
in this process of ‘penetration’ whereby states establish efficient presence in and control 
of the national territory (Paddison, 1983: 9) and socialise its inhabitants (Newman, 
2006; Duchacek, 1970). Michael Mann (1984) used the concept ‘state infrastructural 
power’ to refer to a variety of penetration processes strengthening the autonomous 
power of the state, including a division of labour, coinage, weights and measures, 
literacy, and communication and transport infrastructure. In nineteenth-century Europe, 
this process has been clearly visible through the establishment of dispersed public 
services and the creation of infrastructure networks. It is in this period that many states 
saw the building of town halls, post offices, railway stations, etc. The development and 
modernisation of national administrations led to the creation of a series of 
deconcentrated offices and services. This strengthened the presence of the centre in 
remote and peripheral areas, or even made it genuinely visible for the first time.  
Other examples are the creation of national railway systems, which ‘froze’ the 
territorial structure of Europe (Flora et al., 1999: 157), or the building of major national 
roads. Eugen Weber referred to road-building in nineteenth-century France as a way of 
linking the centre to the periphery, and these roads could effectively be labelled 
‘administrative highways’(Weber, 1976: 195), facilitating the movement of troops, tax 
collectors, school inspectors, etc. The result, according to Weber, was a ‘system built to 
serve the government and the cities’ that, due to its highly centralised nature and 
resulting lack of a ‘supporting network of secondary thoroughfares had little to do with 
popular habit or need’ (ibid.). The same goes for the structure of railway systems, 
whose networks tend to radiate to and from the capital in centralised states. 
The result of the modernisation of the state and the resulting state penetration, not 
only in nineteenth-century European states but also in their colonies in the mid-
twentieth century, was that ‘Even in the most remote parts of a country, states have had 
a huge impact … Remote villages have state-financed police, roads, potable water, state 
tax collectors, credit, marketing cooperatives, schools, subsidised contraceptives, 
electricity, health care, and more’ (Migdal, 2001: 55). The establishment of a field-
service apparatus greatly facilitated the execution of policies and the control over local 
jurisdictions (Paddison, 1983: 9). 
A key process in this penetration is ‘boundary-building’, by which the scope and 
extent of the territory and the state is clearly demarcated. In its territorial sense, 
boundary-defining is easy to imagine. In its social meaning, the boundary separates ‘the 
state from other non-state, or private, actors and social forces’ (Migdal, 2001: 17). The 
latter was highly visible in European struggles for hegemony between the secular state 
and the Church (Gill, 2003). In a situation with mixed state and non-state provision of 
public services, and especially in situations where geographical boundaries are unclear, 
disputed, or changing, such boundary building may be difficult (Anderson, 1991: 114), 
and may have an adverse effect on penetration capacity, and thus state- and nation-
building. 
These examples show that the process of penetration is not always a harmonious 
and uncontested one. It is about establishing control. It is noteworthy that, in his work 
on state-building, Charles Tilly also used ‘state-making’. It refers to a coercive process 
of penetration by attacking, eliminating and neutralising internal rivals (Tilly, 1992: 54; 
1985: 181). This may or may not include the introduction of merit-based bureaucracies 
to curtail the power and privileges of other dominant groups in the organisation of 
public services (Jacoby, 1973: 175). The frequent use of the terms ‘centre’ and 
‘periphery’ in the state- and nation-building literature implies a relation of subordination 
of the periphery to the centre (Gottmann, 1980: 17). It requires that the state supersedes 
or controls alternative sources of authority, or those that are or could become challenges 
to its supremacy. 
 
4.2 Processes of standardisation 
 
A second key process, different from but related to penetration, is standardisation, 
namely, a process of establishing a standard, in this case an administrative or service-
delivery standard that applies to the entire polity. Standardisation and centralisation 
generally move in pairs. The establishment of royal bureaucracies and of systems of tax 
collection and justices of the peace in the feudal and early modern states is the first 
example. Later evolutions showed central royal power growing with the expansion of 
national bureaucracies. This combination of centralisation and standardisation is 
perhaps best visible in the legal and administrative reforms initiated by Napoleon, or 
earlier in the acts of enlightened despots such as the Habsburg Maria Theresa and her 
son Joseph II who had a weakness for administrative uniformity (Scott, 1990). 
In later stages, standardisation is expressed through similar administrative 
procedures for all citizens: the use of identification documents (Torpey, 2000); a 
statistical system for the classification of citizens, groups, and territories (Scott, 1998); 
integrated curricula for schools (Gellner, 1983: 52); networks of post offices; uniforms 
for certain public-sector staff; national television (Dhoest, 2007); a common 
architecture for public buildings; etc. In many cases encounters between citizens and 
administrations and public institutions such as schools or the army (conscription) also 
contributed to the creation of a common language. Standardisation, as exercised through 
public services, contributed to the creation of a common culture through the presence of 
similar and readily identifiable public services. Riggs speaks in this context about state 
nationalism (Riggs, 1997: 351), where a state creates a nation. Public services diffuse 
cultural symbols of statehood and nationhood (Shils, 1975: 39). They are symbols of 
state presence. Through a process of homogenisation (Tilly, 1975a), this standardisation 
attempts to build a moral unity (Wang, 2003: 37). The state, using its services, builds an 
imagined community (Anderson, 1991); it manufactures and nourishes imagery, and it 
communicates a package of ideals (Price, 1995: 46).  
A bureaucracy is a means to control diverging tendencies in autonomous bodies, 
agencies and organisations, and thus to integrate them (Poggi, 1990: 31-2). 
Standardisation may therefore require the annihilation or suppression of alternative 
autonomous power centres or delivery mechanisms (for example, through local strong 
men) that compete for people’s loyalty and identity (Wang, 2003). This may even mean 
changing, dismantling or neutralising well-functioning service-delivery mechanisms 
(Braun, 1975). It may also lead to the suppression of diverging identities (the former 
  
French centralist approach geared towards the suppression of regional languages is a 
good example). This standardisation aids identification with the state, and, by doing so, 
also attempts to break down identification with alternative authorities (such as other 
states, regional or local interests, or competing leaders). The processes of modernisation 
with which nineteenth-century European state-building is associated are characterised 
by a certain degree of ‘enforced uniformity’ (Poggi, 1990: 81). This extends to those 
employed in public services. It is insufficient that someone performs his/her duty in 
delivering a service. He/she also needs to identify with a wider state apparatus and show 
solidarity and connection with fellow public-sector workers. Such a process of 
standardisation is probably relatively straightforward in a context of rapid 
modernisation when many of the public services are new rather than replacing existing 
ones. It may be much more damaging in a context where efficient alternative service-
delivery mechanisms already exist. 
 
4.3 Processes of accommodation 
 
Accommodation refers to processes of reconciliation or settlement, generally between 
elites. Adding it to our list of processes helps to explain why processes of penetration 
and standardisation have actually worked and have encountered less resistance than one 
might expect. Public services may serve as instruments for dispute settlement and for 
the creation of political loyalty. Despite what NPM-style literature may lead us to 
believe, public services and public servants do more than delivering undisputed services 
in a neutral manner.  
The vast scholarship on the role of politics, political appointments, spoils etc. in 
administrations demonstrates the extent to which the provision of public services and of 
positions within them is a key element in political power-brokering and 
accommodation. Accommodation may be a means of ‘binding critical elements of the 
population to the state’ (Migdal, 2001: 77) and act as a safeguard against the 
development of competing centres of power within the state (ibid.: 75). Public services 
are in such a case a tool to buy loyalty and to make disloyalty expensive. Working with 
local notables rather than imposing power has in some cases been a very effective 
strategy (Gill, 2003). Furthermore, by providing a clear path for social mobility, public-
sector employment has contributed to social harmony and has promoted citizens’ 
identification with the state. 
In divided societies, public services may contribute to the maintenance of a 
delicate balance between groups. They have had, and still have in the case of 
developing or post-conflict countries, a role in nation- and identity-building and 
pacification (Stillman, 2000: 18; Thompson, 1965: 208). Sharing out public-sector jobs 
or a promise to provide certain facilities to certain individuals, groups or regions is an 
excellent instrument to cement political pacts. Such processes of accommodation are 
especially visible in ethnically divided societies where quota are sometimes used in the 
distribution of public offices (Bangura, 2006). Public administration, institutions and 
services may help to resolve cultural conflicts between majorities and minorities. 
Bourgeois speaks in this context of ‘administrative consociationalism’ (Bourgeois, 
2007: 633), echoing Lijphart’s concept which has largely been applied to political 
structures at the central level (Lijphart, 1977), rather than to a more decentralised level 
of public-service delivery such as schools and local public services. This shows that a 
distribution of resources in the modern state should not just be approached from an 
equity perspective, but that there is also a strong instrumental dimension to 
redistribution (Wang, 2003). 
Accommodation and dispute settlement may require some decisions which may 
not always be well-received and may be criticised for their lack of democratic character. 
These processes of accommodation reveal an interesting paradox in state- and nation-
building initiatives, especially when these initiatives also aim to promote 
democratisation. Elite pacts, including arrangements on public-service delivery, in a 
way attempt to achieve the principles of the modern democratic state by using methods 
that would not generally be associated with such a polity. O’Donnell and Schmitter 
made a similar point when they introduced the concept of elite pacts into the political-
science literature through their study on transitions from authoritarianism in Latin 
America: ‘Ironically, such modern pacts move the polity toward democracy by 
undemocratic means’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 38). 
The opposite case, however, while based on a similar principle, generally attracts 
much less criticism. We have seen several instances where certain groups have been 
removed from administrative and public-service positions precisely for their lack of 
loyalty to, or even betrayal of, the polity. This tends to happen in times of change and of 
challenged power. Good examples are the lustration processes in several Central and 
Eastern European post-communist societies, especially in Czechoslovakia; de-
nazification in post-war Germany; or more recently de-Baathification in Iraq (David, 
2006; Ellis, 1996). Yet, for the sake of completeness it needs to be mentioned that 
public services are less subject to such processes than, for example, military or political 
bodies. Just as with other acts of accommodation or of standardisation, such lustration 
processes may also have an adverse impact on the ability of public services to deliver, 
for example because all expertise has been weeded out (Dobbins et al., 2003: 13-14). 
 
5 Implications for donors 
 
To summarise briefly, this article has argued that public-service delivery is not neutral 
but a highly political matter. It has demonstrated how service provision has been used in 
European history as a state tool for penetration (territorial consolidation and the 
integration of peripheries), for standardisation (homogenisation of the population and its 
experiences) and for accommodation (including pacification, buying loyalty and power-
brokering). So what does all this mean for international donors keen to engage in 
service provision and state-building interventions in developing countries? Is this 
European experience, and these European models and processes, relevant or transferable 
to a development context?  
 
5.1 Transferability 
 
Whilst some international development researchers suggest that transferable lessons can 
be gleaned from the European example (Moore, 2004), others strongly assert that they 
cannot (Herbst, 2000). These contrary perspectives seem to centre on the question of the 
similarity of context. The European model grew out of a feudal system, and this has 
been regarded as a reason why ‘[T]he European state-building experiences will not 
repeat themselves in new states’ (Tilly, 1975b: 81). In a feudal system, with its 
  
dispersed power, suppressing the local power base that could challenge the state was 
relatively easy. Some, for this reason, suggest that Europe may have been the special 
case in history, rather than the model. Another significant difference between European 
state-building and current state-building processes in developing countries is the 
involvement of many external and international actors in the latter, including multi- and 
bi-lateral donors, NGOs and private institutions, each with its own practices and 
political agendas (Zaum, 2007).  
So, given that there are significant differences and similarities between the 
contexts, can any lessons be learned? We do not contend that lessons from European 
history can be lifted directly and applied unquestioningly to the diverse contexts of 
developing countries where state-building ventures are taking place. However, we do 
argue that there are some broad principles that we can take from a backward glance at 
history to inform current and future practice. Learning about the European examples 
may facilitate analysis of the situation in other countries (Flora et al., 1999; Rokkan, 
1975). In this context it is of crucial importance to recognise the wide variety of state-
building processes in European states. The French and British experiences, for example, 
are very different, with the former being much more centralist. In addition, single 
countries have not always followed the same model over time, and have combined 
different approaches, some more centralised, others more decentralised (Gill, 2003). 
However, despite the diversity of the European experience and the specificity of the 
European context, we argue that the evidence of the impact of services on state 
processes in European history is highly relevant to current state-building initiatives. The 
rest of the article will explore the practical implications for the international donor 
community. 
 
5.2 Donors and penetration, standardisation and accommodation 
 
There are several reasons, articulated below, as to why donors should pay more 
attention to the political aspects of service delivery in fragile states and developing 
countries. In many ways, service provision, if managed properly, can play a role in 
furthering donor agendas for state-building. For example, state governments in fragile 
environments often have weak or no control over large sections of their territory 
(Herbst, 2000:19; Lister and Wilder, 2005). Governance in these areas can alternatively 
be provided by warlords, strong men and patrimonialist networks or traditional tribal 
systems (Reno, 1998; Lister and Wilder, 2005; Jackson, 2003). In aiming to build states, 
donors are often keen to expand the control of the central government beyond the 
confines of the capital city. Therefore, the potential ability of service provision to act as 
a non-violent vehicle for territorial penetration is very attractive to international donors 
aiming to build capable states that have controlling presence, authority and visibility 
throughout their land.  
Standardisation is a trickier concept to discuss in this context. It maps on to donor 
aims if it can be translated as being a process that creates equality of access to public 
services; all citizens gain the same level of access to similar standards of public services 
throughout the territory. Conflict inspired by grievance over ‘horizontal inequalities’ 
(Stewart et al., 2008) is therefore mitigated, as no single group enjoys privileged access 
to basic services. However, the idea that donors engaging in service provision are 
inherently creating a cultural identity is more contentious. In some contexts, for 
example Afghanistan, donors might be pleased to assist in the creation of a cultural 
identity that maps on to the governing state rather than being exclusively related to 
ethnic identity. However, several authors emphasise that the development of cultural 
identity should be an endogenous process and is not something in which external actors 
should meddle (Etzioni, 2004; Ottaway, 2002) An additional problem is that the 
development community as a whole tends to promote social inclusion and embrace 
cultural diversity rather than express intolerance towards it. And finally, the question 
remains over what to do in contexts where alternative, non-state systems of service 
provision already exist (Lister and Wilder, 2005).  
Lastly, how does accommodation via service provision map on to donor 
ambitions? Whilst most donors would be delighted with the idea that service provision 
can be a method of dispute settlement and generate political loyalty, the concept of 
explicitly using service delivery as a political tool is extremely contentious. Openly 
using services as methods of ‘power-brokering’ as opposed to the more neutral idea of 
basing delivery design on principles of equity and equality is a highly controversial 
idea. Although donors have historically been reluctant to admit to the political role they 
play in the countries in which they work, the UK Department for International 
Development, for example, is increasingly considering the impact of elite pacts or 
‘political settlements’ on facilitating developmental goals. This is an emerging area of 
research in the development field. 
 
5.3 Implications for international donors 
 
Three further findings of our analysis deserve discussion, and are included here as 
statements that international donors must seriously consider when engaging in service 
provision as a state-building enterprise. Donors need to be realistic about the political 
role that their interventions play. That means analysing their role and the way they 
design programmes from a political perspective and embracing that potential, rather 
than being unable, or afraid, to engage in discussion over the political aspects of 
development interventions like service delivery. 
(i) Efficiency may not be the best guiding principle for the design of public 
services in developing countries and fragile states. This is a highly controversial 
statement. Donors, with their accountability to the tax-payer, are understandably 
reluctant to admit that state-building is anything other than a straightforward, 
technocratic, apolitical undertaking. Unfortunately, in reality the opposite is usually the 
case. Obviously, service provision must be efficient enough to not alienate the 
population and thereby undermine the legitimacy of the state, or provoke conflict 
amongst different groups (Brinkerhoff, 2005: 5; Jackson and Scott, 2007). However, the 
above examples from Western Europe show that there may be situations where a 
political decision could be made to sacrifice efficiency for the ‘greater good’ of 
furthering penetration, standardisation or accommodation. An example may be 
establishing more health centres than strictly necessary in a given area in order to raise 
the visibility of the state there or to pacify an aggrieved group who have previously felt 
excluded from access to basic services. A more controversial example would be buying 
off local elites with jobs in public services in order to ensure their loyalty to the nascent 
state. Early European state-building in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries showed a 
need to make civil servants first loyal to the ruler, and only later efficient and impartial 
  
(Fischer and Lundgreen, 1975: 457). As long as the legitimacy of the state is contested, 
loyalty needs to be created.  
(ii) State-building is not always a democratic process. Much of the state-building 
process is about coercion and the accommodation of certain groups or power factions, 
or at least it is a relatively centrally-driven process in its early stages. Processes of 
homogenisation, standardisation, boundary-defining and penetration are unlikely to be 
universally popular. The building of states in Western Europe was in some cases costly 
and involved ‘death, suffering, loss of rights and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or 
labor’ (Tilly, 1975b: 71). Many were forged through blood and iron (Ottaway, 2002: 
16). Populations often resisted the creation of states. This was visible in tax rebellions, 
food riots, and resistance to conscription (ibid.).  
The creation of nations required homogenisation of certain groups in society, and 
sometimes the destruction of existing power structures. The process was dominated by a 
desire for stability and security, not democracy. A second and related element, 
therefore, is that much of the nation- and state-building was an elite-driven process. 
Nationalist movements appealed to the masses, but they were very often initiated by 
societal elites. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) gave pacts between elites a central role 
in transitions from authoritarian rule, and consociational arrangements are in a similar 
way an accommodation between elites (Lijphart, 1977). We note Ottoway’s observation 
that ‘The world should not be fooled into thinking that it is possible to build states 
without coercion’ (Ottaway, 2002: 18). Harsh compromises are often necessary, and 
these include military coercion and ‘the recognition that democracy is not always a 
realistic goal’ (ibid.: 16). Yet, at the same time, counter-examples in some countries 
show the value of gradually establishing modern central bureaucracies, with little 
coercion. 
The observation that state-building is not always a democratic process creates 
important dilemmas for international donors, because it may require them to engage in 
practices of which they have hitherto officially disapproved. It also highlights a 
discrepancy between the official policy rhetoric and practices in the field, which has 
massive potential to become controversial in donors’ home countries and parliaments. 
(iii) There is a tension between supporting nation-building and contributing to 
nationalism. State- and nation-building and nationalism are very closely related. 
Nationalism does not always have a good name; a stimulation of nationalism combined 
with political or even ethnic accommodation strategies may be difficult or risky. Certain 
processes inherent to state- and nation-building such as socialisation through the school 
system, army, media, or public services, or processes of boundary defining, can easily 
slip into forms of extreme nationalism. State- and nation-building may lead to the 
destruction of existing identities and allegiances, and may come at a cost for certain 
groups that are being assimilated. Processes of political socialisation, or the instilling of 
desirable features in the population, may be felt as highly intrusive and invasive 
(Miguel, 2004: 331). Nationalist approaches to the organisation of public services may 
also lead to the destruction of well-functioning existing public services and public 
goods, to be replaced by national ones, for the sake of it. The right balance between 
public services that function effectively, efficiently and economically, and public 
services that reflect and propagate a national or a state identity, may be particularly hard 
to find. 
By way of a conclusion, then, this article has a number of theoretical, but also 
practical, implications for the donor community. First, we conclude that service 
provision is an inherently political process, even more so in fragile or state-building 
contexts. It is impossible to predict from European examples precise routes of 
development, but we can conclude from our analysis that service provision can play a 
role in enhancing or undermining state legitimacy and social cohesion. Donors must 
change their practices and resource allocations to reflect this. For example, service 
provision should no longer be pursued in fragile states as a ‘quick win’ or a neutral 
intervention. Instead, political-economy analysis should be incorporated into 
programme design, resulting in more politically considered, coherent and long-term 
approaches to service delivery. Finally, in taking this area more seriously, donors should 
fund further research into how services have contributed to state-building agendas in 
developing countries with a view to distilling ‘lessons learned’ into operational tools to 
inform policy-making and, it is to be hoped, ensure more politically astute interventions 
in the future.  
 
 
References 
 
Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism. New York: Verso (revised edn). 
Bangura, Y. (2006) Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Barker, E. (1944) The Development of Public Services in Western Europe 1660-1930. 
London: Oxford University Press. 
Batley, R. A. (2004) ‘The Politics of Service Delivery Reform’, Development and 
Change 35 (11): 31-56. 
Batley, R. A. and McLoughlin, C. (2010) ‘Engagement with Non-State Service 
Providers in Fragile States: Reconciling State-building and Service Delivery’, 
Development Policy Review 28 (2): 131-54. 
Bendix, R. (1964) Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social 
Order. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Berger, M. and Weber, H. (2006) ‘Beyond State-building: Global Governance and the 
Crisis of the Nation-State System in the 21st Century’, Third World Quarterly 27 
(1): 201-08. 
Bourgeois, D. (2007) ‘Administrative Nationalism’, Administration and Society 39 (5): 
631-55. 
Braun, R. (1975) ‘Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-building: Great Britain 
and Brandenburg Prussia’ in Tilly. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2005) ‘Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-conflict 
Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-cutting Themes’, Public Administration and 
Development 25: 3-15. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. and Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002) ‘Governance Reforms and Failed 
States: Challenges and Implications’, International Review of Administrative 
Sciences 68: 511-31. 
David, R. (2006) ‘From Prague to Baghdad: Lustration Systems and their Political 
Effects’, Government and Opposition 41 (3): 347-72. 
  
Dhoest, A. (2007) ‘Identifying with the Nation: Viewer Memories of Flemish TV 
Fiction’, European Journal of Cultural Studies 10 (1): 55-73. 
Di John, J. and Putzel, J. (2009) Political Settlements. An Emerging Issues Research 
Service Paper. Birmingham: Governance and Social Development Resource 
Centre (GSDRC), University of Birmingham, UK (www.gsdrc.org/ 
docs/open/EIRS7.pdf).  
Dinnen, S. (2006) ‘Nation-Building’. Concepts Paper. Draft paper for AusAID. 
Dobbins, J.; McGinn, J. G.; Crane, K.; Jones, S. G.; Lall, R.; Rathmell, A.; Swanger, R. 
and Timilsina, A. (2003) America's Role in Nation-building from Germany to 
Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
Duchacek, I. D. (1970) Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics. 
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Eisenstadt, S. N. and Rokkan, S. (1973) Building States and Nations: Models and Data 
Resources, Vol. I. London: Sage Publications. 
Eldon, J. and Gunby, D. (2009) ‘States in Development: State-building and Service 
Delivery’. London: HLSP (www.hlsp.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket= 
pTubyMeHSxk%3d&tabid=1791&mid=3720).  
Ellis, M. S. (1996) ‘Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the 
Former Communist Bloc’, Law and Contemporary Problems 59 (4): 181-96. 
Etzioni, A. (2004) ‘A Self-restrained Approach to Nation-building by Foreign Powers’, 
International Affairs 80 (1): 1-17. 
Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (1985) Bringing the State Back In. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fesler, J. W. (1965) ‘Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization’, The 
Journal of Politics 27 (3): 536-66. 
Finer, S. E. (1999) The History of Government from the Earliest Times, Volume III: 
Empires, Monarchies and the Modern State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Finer, S. E. (1975) ‘State- and Nation-building in Europe: The Role of the Military’ in 
Tilly. 
Fischer, W. and Lundgreen, P. (1975) ‘The Recruitment and Training of Administrative 
and Technical Personnel’ in Tilly. 
Flora, P., Kuhnle, S. and Urwin, D. (1999) State Formation, Nation-building, and Mass 
Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Fukuyama, F. (2004) State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first 
Century. London: Profile books. 
Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Gill, G. (2003) The Nature and Development of the Modern State. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan 
Goldsmith, A. (2007) ‘Does Nation-building Work?’ in D. Brinkerhoff (ed.), 
Governance in Post-Conflict Societies: Rebuilding Fragile States. New York: 
Routledge. 
Gottmann, J. (1980) ‘Confronting Centre and Periphery’ in J. Gottmann (ed.), Centre 
and Periphery: Spatial Variation in Politics. London: Sage. 
Herbst, J. (2000) States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and 
Control. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hippler, J. (ed.) (2005) Nation-building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict 
Transformation?London: Pluto Press. 
Hopp, U. and Kloke-Lesche, A. (2005) ‘External Nation-building vs. Endogenous 
Nation-forming: A Development Policy Perspective’, in Hippler. 
Jackson, P. (2003) ‘Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance’, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 14 (2): 131-50. 
Jackson, P. and Scott, Z. (2007) ‘Local Government in Post-conflict Contexts’, 
Literature review and report to UNDP and the Oslo Governance Centre. 
Jacoby, H. (1973) The Bureaucratization of the World. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Lister, S. and Wilder, A. (2005) ‘Strengthening Subnational Administration in 
Afghanistan: Technical Reform or State-building?’, Public Administration and 
Development 25: 39-48. 
Mallaby, S. (2002) ‘The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States and the Case for 
American Empire’, Foreign Affairs 81 (2): 2-7. 
Mann, M. (1984) ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and 
Results’, Archives européennes de sociologie 25: 185-213. 
Migdal, J. S. (2001) State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and 
Constitute One Another. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Miguel, E. (2004) ‘Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya Versus 
Tanzania’, World Politics 56: 327-62. 
Moore, M. (2004) ‘Revenues, State Formation and the Quality of Governance in 
Developing Countries’, International Political Science Review 25 (3): 297-319. 
Newman, D. (2006) ‘The Resilience of Territorial Conflict in an Era of Globalization’, 
in M. Kahler and B. F. Walter (eds), Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of 
Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
O’Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. C. (1986) Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
OECD (2008a) Concepts and Dilemmas of State-building in Fragile States: From 
Fragility to Resilience. OECD / DAC Discussion Paper. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2008b) Service Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key Concepts, Findings and 
Lessons. Paris: OECD. 
Ottaway, M. (2002) ‘Nation Building’, Foreign Policy 132: 16-24. 
Paddison, R. (1983) The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Paris, R. (2006) Understanding the ‘Co-ordination Problem’ in Post-war State-
building. RPPS Working Paper. Research Partnership on Post-War State-
building. 
Poggi, G. (1990) The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Price, M. E. (1995) Television, the Public Sphere and National Identity. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
  
Reno, W. (1998) Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Riggs, F. W. (1997) ‘Modernity and Bureaucracy’, Public Administration Review 57 
(4): 347-53. 
Rocha Menocal, A. (2010) State-building for Peace – A New Paradigm for 
International Engagement in Post-Conflict Fragile States? EUI Working Papers 
RSCAS 2010 / 34. San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy: Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies European Report on Development 
(http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/ 
bitstream/1814/13716/1/RSCAS_2010_34.pdf).  
Rokkan, S. (1975) ‘Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-building: A Possible 
Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe’, in Tilly. 
Rokkan, S.; Urwin, D.; Aarebrot, F. H.; Malaba, P. and Sande, T. (1987) Centre-
periphery Structures in Europe: An ISSC Workbook in Comparative Analysis. 
Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. 
Rondinelli, D. A. and Montgomery, J. D. (2005) ‘Regime Change and Nation Building: 
Can Donors Restore Governance in Post-conflict States?’, Public Administration 
and Development 25: 15-23. 
Scott, H. M. (1990) ‘Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1740-1790’, in H. M. Scott 
(ed.), Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-
century Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Scott, J. C. (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Šelo Šabić, S. (2005) State Building under Foreign Supervision: Intervention in Bosnia-
Herzegovina 1996-2003. Vienna: Bureau for Security Policy, Austrian Ministry 
of Defence and National Defence Academy, and Zagreb: Institute for 
International Relations. 
Shils, E. (1975) Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Stewart, F., Brown, G. K. and Langer, A. (2008) ‘Policies Towards Horizontal 
Inequalities’, in F. Stewart (ed.), Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: 
Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Stillman, R. J. I. (2000) Public Administration: Concepts and Cases. 7th edn. Boston, 
MA: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Stone, D. C. (1965) ‘Public Administration and Nation-building’, in C. M. Roscoe (ed.), 
Public Administration and Democracy: Essays in Honor of Paul H. Appleby. 
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 
Thompson, V. A. (1965) ‘Bureaucracy in a Democratic Society’, in C. M. Roscoe (ed.), 
Public Administration and Democracy: Essays in Honor of Paul H. Appleby. 
Syracuse, NY Syracuse University Press. 
Tilly, C. (1992) Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Tilly, C. (1985) ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in Evans et al.. 
Tilly, C. (1975a) The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Tilly, C. (1975b) ‘Reflections on the History of European State-making’, in Tilly. 
Torpey, J. (2000) The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Waldman, R. (2007) Health Programming for Rebuilding States: A Briefing Paper. 
BASICS project. Washington, DC: USAID. 
Wang, S. (2003) ‘The Problem of State Weakness’, Journal of Democracy 14 (1): 36-
42. 
Weber, E. (1976) Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-
1914. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Weber, M. (1974) ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. 
(translators and eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. London and 
Boston, MA: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Whaites A. (2008) States in Development: Understanding State-building. London: 
DFID. 
Zaum, D. (2007) The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International 
State-building. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
